John Lonergan, BCL final-year student, Trinity College Dublin
John Lonergan is a final-year student and Non-Foundation Scholar of Trinity College Dublin. He has interests in private law generally. He would like to thank his family and friends for their support, and to the members of the UCD Sutherland Symposium for their invaluable contributions and dedication to this piece.
Abstract
This article examines the growing debate surrounding third-party litigation funding in Ireland, a practice that remains prohibited under the doctrines of maintenance and champerty. Despite the Irish Supreme Court’s confirmation of this prohibition in Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v Minister for Public Enterprise, increasing judicial and academic concern has emerged regarding the impact of the ban on access to justice.
The piece traces the historical origins of maintenance and champerty, and highlights how rules designed to address abuses in medieval litigation continue to shape modern Irish law. It analyses recent judicial developments, including Atlas GP Ltd v Kelly and Campbell v Irish Light. It is questioned whether Ireland’s continued prohibition is sustainable in a context where litigation costs remain extremely high. The article explores the potential benefits of legalising third-party funding, including improved access to justice, greater equality of arms between litigants, and enhanced opportunities for Ireland to develop as an international dispute-resolution hub. On the other hand, there are concerns regarding commercialisation of litigation, claimant compensation, and the need for robust regulatory safeguards. With the Law Reform Commission expected to publish recommendations on the issue soon, this article considers whether Ireland is finally approaching a decisive turning point in the future of litigation funding.
Introduction
Third-party litigation funding is when an entity unconnected to a party in a legal dispute, finances the cost of resolving the dispute on behalf of that party. If the funded party wins the case or gets a settlement, the funder is repaid the funded money plus an additional payment.[1] It is a beneficial arrangement for both parties, one which is currently prohibited under Irish law. Notably, the illegality of third-party litigation funding in Ireland was recently confirmed in the Supreme Court decision of Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v Minister for Public Enterprise.[2] The High Court found evidence that the litigation at hand was funded by a third-party, and that this is a prohibited practice.[3] The Supreme Court confirmed this on appeal, holding the torts of maintenance and champerty still exist in Ireland and ‘a person who assists another’s proceedings without a bona fide independent interest acts unlawfully’.[4] Nonetheless there is still considerable judicial disquiet over the doctrine. For instance, Clarke J. in the Supreme Court, while agreeing with the majority, expressed a ‘significant feeling of disquiet’ that the claimant would otherwise not be able to bring this case without such funding.[5] Furthermore, Clarke J. stated:
I consider that it can be said that there is at least an arguable case that the constitutional right of access to the court may include an entitlement that that right be effective, not just as a matter of law and form, but also in practice.[6]
He stated that there was an ‘an increasing problem emerging in relation to that constitutional entitlement’.[7] Evidently, Clarke J. feared constitutional rights being breached by virtue of the inability of private individuals to have their cases heard due to their lack of access to funds.
Given that third-party funding is an understudied and evolving phenomenon, and that the Law Reform Commission will be issuing its Report and Recommendations on this topic in the coming months, it is apt to consider the benefits and advantages of introducing a viable model for third-party litigation funding in Ireland. In the first section of this piece, relevant case law will be considered. In the second section, policy considerations supporting the legalisation of third-party funding will be examined. In the third section, the policy considerations supporting retaining the illegality of third-party funding will be analysed. Finally, conclusions from both sets of arguments will be drawn.
II. Maintenance and Champerty: Historical Perspectives to the Present
Historically, public policy has held much sway over the issue of third-party funding of litigation. Maintenance and champerty, which make it illegal for a third-party to assist a party to proceedings by funding litigation, are both torts under the Maintenance and Embracery Act 1634 and it is fair to say that historically legal policy has been hostile to both torts.[8]Maintenance is the financial support of a third-party where the third-party does not receive a share of the proceeds should the litigation be successful.[9] Champerty is similar, but where the third-party expects to receive a share of the proceeds upon successful litigation. Maintenance and champerty were designed to curtail abuses in medieval England, where unethical nobles would lend their names, titles and resources to bolster weak, fraudulent claims in return for a share of the property recovered.[10] These torts were founded in the medieval and Christian understanding that litigation should be prevented as much as possible and that litigiousness was a vice.[11] In addition, feudal barons tended to settle disputes by courtroom trials, judges and juries, in a process involving bribery, corruption and intimidation.[12] The survival of the torts have been attributed to a ‘persisting fear that they are still needed as a safeguard against blackmail and speculation in lawsuits prone to increase litigation.’[13]
However, by the 1800s there were those who thought that the doctrines of maintenance and champerty were unnecessary.[14] Jeremy Bentham for one observed that the restrictions on the funding of litigation were a ‘barbarous precaution’ born out of a ‘barbarous age’.[15] The ‘historic necessity’ for protection passed, with the court system becoming much more resilient and consistent.[16] While the torts of maintenance and champerty were abolished in England,[17] in Ireland, maintenance and champerty remain both actionable torts and criminal offences, making the provision of third-party funding a criminal act.[18] Despite this, there have been no convictions for either offence in the history of the state.[19]Accordingly, given the proposed value of third-party litigation funding and the relative ineffectuality of maintenance and champerty in the contemporary context, the Law Reform Commission (LRC) has issued a Consultation Paper on Third-Party-Funding.[20] A brief outline of this Consultation Paper is appropriate here. In 2016, as part of its Fourth Programme of Law Reform,[21] the Commission published an Issues Paper on Contempt of Court and Other Offences and Torts Involving the Administration of Justice.[22] Within this Issues Paper, submissions were sought on whether the torts and offences of maintenance and champerty should be abolished, whether third-party funding should be permitted and how, if legalised, third-party funding should be regulated. In light of the significant judgment in Persona, the Commission thought it appropriate to publish a detailed Consultation Paper, setting out an up-to-date position as to the legal position of third-party-funding in this jurisdiction. The purpose of this Report was merely to inform debate.[23] The Report has several points that are of particular note. The LRC noted that any regulatory framework adopted for the third-party funding must be capable of operating coherently in conjunction with regulatory and legislative developments in other spheres.[24] This is appropriate in light of the legalisation of third-party funding in international commercial arbitration and in related proceedings,[25] impending legalisation and statutory regulation of representative actions (to include representative actions funded by a third-party),[26] as well as movements at EU level to regulate the third-party funding sector.[27]There has yet to be any legislation enacted in response to the LRC Report.
As noted in the introduction, the LRC is currently in an advanced stage of its full Report on Third-Party Litigation Funding, in which it will make recommendations as to the future regulation of this area of the law. The full Report may be released in the middle of this year.[28]
There had been little in the way of case law in this field in this jurisdiction before the Persona case.[29] This was the first case that came before the Irish Supreme Court that directly considered the acceptability of third-party funding in Ireland.[30] Both the High Court and Supreme Court confirmed that the principles of maintenance and champerty are still good law, and remain enforceable.[31] The facts in Persona are relatively simple. The claimants were part of a consortium that competed for a large mobile telecommunications licence, which was in the end awarded to Esat Digiphone. The claimants brought proceedings against the Minister for Communications, claiming that, inter alia, the Minister unlawfully interfered in the competition for the licence. The claimants had entered into an investment agreement with Harmour Fund II to provide financing to fund the case. The matter went to Donnelly J. in the High Court who determined that there was a ‘consistent line of authorities’ which demonstrated that the funding of litigation by a third-party, with no independent interest in the litigation, was prohibited.[32] The plaintiffs applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal directly from the High Court, a leapfrog appeal that bypassed the Court of Appeal, as it was a matter of public importance.[33] Leave was granted, and the issue was determined to be thus:
Whether third party funding, provided during the course of proceedings (rather than at their outset) to support a plaintiff who is unable to progress a case of immense public importance, is unlawful by reason of the rules on maintenance and champerty.[34]
In what Capper calls a ‘fairly predictable outcome’,[35] the Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, holding that the crimes of maintenance and champerty continue to exist in Ireland.[36] Interestingly, Denham C.J. did not find the fact that the funding was provided during the course of proceedings, and not from the outset, a relevant factor.[37] Similarly, the fact that the case was described as one of ‘immense public importance’ was not considered a relevant factor,[38] and thus it appears to be a bright line rule against third-party funding. Denham C.J., for the majority, opined that this would be more suitable for a ‘full legislative analysis.’[39] In a concurring judgment, Clarke J. also considered that such a change would require legislative intervention.[40]
Moving forward, the doctrine has also been examined in the High Court in two recent cases. In Atlas GP Ltd v Kelly,[41]an Bord Pleanála granted the plaintiff planning permission for a strategic housing development. The defendants were a residents association who circulated a flyer opposing the housing development and sought support for the costs of judicial review. The plaintiff instituted proceedings seeking inter alia damages for maintenance and champerty. Egan J. held that an essential element of the tort was that the third-party funder had no interest in the proceedings and was unjustifiably meddling. The Court held in the present case, the local community had a common interest in the issue and could have a legitimate interest in bringing these proceedings in relation to the local area’s development. However, the approach in Persona treats third-party litigation funding as automatically champerty and maintenance, and prima facie unlawful.[42]As a result, Egan J. held that the proceedings were not funded by unlawful means, as any residents who donated in support of the litigation had a bona fide interest in the proceedings.
Some similarly liberalising soundings were stated in Campbell v Irish Light.[43] The plaintiff was the recipient of GoFundMe.com funding from around 1,000 people in support of the plaintiffs legal costs. The defendant argued that this amounted to maintenance and champerty. The plaintiff claimed that this was intended as charitable donations. Consequently, the plaintiff claimed that this could not be maintenance or champerty, as no one was seeking to benefit financially from litigation. Nolan J. found that he could see no evidence to suggest champerty and the evidence suggested that the donations were charitable.[44] The court drew a clear and appropriate distinction between maintenance and champerty on the one hand, and anonymous donations on the other hand. Nolan J. quoted with approval the judgment of Denham C.J. in Persona, which in turn quotes the LRC’s Issues Paper on ‘Contempt of Court and other offences and torts involving the administration of Justice’ which stated:
The crime, and tort, of maintenance occurs where a third party supports litigation without just cause. Champerty is an ‘aggravated form’ of maintenance where the third party supports litigation without just cause in return for a share of the proceeds. (Greenclean Waste Management Ltd. v. Leahy p/a Maurice Leahy & Co. Solicitors (No. 2) [2014] IEHC 314).[45]
Nolan J. considered that the ‘key’ phrase from that quote is ‘just cause’.[46] This was a case concerning a donation to a charity. It is clear that no issue of champerty arose here as that would involve a party funding litigation with the hope of making a financial gain.[47] The issue of maintenance was a more difficult one. As Costello J. noted in Fraser v Buckle,[48] maintenance is the giving of assistance or encouragement to one of the parties in an action by a person who has neither an interest in the action nor any other motive recognised by law as justifying his interference. The question to be determined by the court is what is meant by the phrase ‘any other motive recognised by law’.[49] The court held that, in the present case, the donations were to assist the plaintiffs with the cost of her legal actions.[50]
Resultingly, the court refused the defendants’ application.[51] Maintenance will not be established where the case comes within one of the recognised exceptions to maintenance.[52] It has been observed that the rules against maintenance and champerty are subject to ‘strings of exceptions which are neither based on any logical principle nor in their nature afford any warrant that they are exhaustive’.[53] The LRC Report commented that ‘outside Thema International and some limited Australian dicta, there has been relatively little judicial or academic expansion on the charitable exception to maintenance, in either local or foreign precedent’.[54] It is therefore welcome that there has been judicial consideration of the charitable exception from courts in this jurisdiction. The two High Court judgments in Campbell and Kelly appear toshow judicial willingness to confirm that the scope of the agreements recognised as being held to come under the exceptions to maintenance encompass charitable appeals on crowdfunding websites.[55] This is to be welcomed for two reasons. First, it confirms that as the LRC suggested, ‘Irish case law is open to the existence of a charitable exception to maintenance.’[56] Second, it is helpful that an arbitrary line was not drawn between the general charitable exception and the online crowdfunding websites.
III. Policy considerations supporting the legalisation of third-party funding
The principal policy consideration behind legalisation of third-party litigation would be its potential to improve access to justice. In Ireland, legal costs have become inordinately high.[57] For example, the average legal costs in personal injury cases between 2015 and 2019 was €23,000.[58] Extrajudicially, O’Donnell C.J. has commented,on access to justice, saying that it is ‘not enough to provide courtrooms and judges’ but ignore the ‘many barriers that limit the capacity of ordinary citizens…to bring disputes to court and obtain a speedy and fair resolution of those disputes’.[59] Twomey J., in a strong judgment deriding the state of the legal costs landscape in Ireland, has said costs are at ‘millionaire levels’.[60]By legalising third-party funding, cases can be taken by those less wealthy that potentially are not being taken up simply due to a lack of resources. Lord Justice Jackson, in his 2010 report on civil litigation costs in England and Wales, observed that third-party funding is ‘for some parties, the only means of funding litigation. Thus, third-party funding promotes access to justice.’[61] Likewise, it sets a bad example to let defendants walk away blameless, simply due to the plaintiffs’ financial difficulties.[62] Justice is simply not being done in these circumstances, and there are inherent risks that innocent victims are not being compensated. A framework for third-party litigation funding would not be entirely implausible in Ireland given that ‘no foal, no fee’ arrangements in legal practice are very common. This is when the client and legal practitioner agree that if there is no win in the legal case, the client will not have to pay the practitioner fees, and if the claim is successful, the practitioner will recover fees and costs.[63]
In effect, this might be considered a conceptual variant of a funding arrangement. The legal practitioner funds the case on behalf of the client, who agrees to pay the practitioner if they win the case. In a way, the legal practitioner assumes a role partly analogous to a third-party funder: both enable litigation that the claimant might otherwise be unable or unwilling to pursue because of cost exposure. The client, in turn, undertakes to remunerate the practitioner of that support out of any successful recovery. There is a difference between a lawyer performing a legal service and a funding party offering money and the fact that the two are treated differently reflects the historical concern underlying the doctrines of maintenance and champerty. As discussed before, the law was suspicious of strangers who intermeddled in litigation for gain, particularly where they lacked a recognised connection to the dispute. This notion of “legitimate interest” emerged as a justification for permitting certain forms of support that might otherwise have been regarded as intermeddling. Lawyers acting under conditional or contingency-based fee arrangements possess such an interest by virtue of their professional engagement in the proceedings. Their stake in the litigation is that of one intrinsically connected to the performance of legal services and the vindication of the client’s rights. While founded on remuneration rather than profit, however, this practice demonstrates the impetus of alternative arrangements given the financial risks associated with litigation.
In and of themselves, these agreements do not meaningfully alleviate precarity, given the practitioner is obligated to shoulder the legal costs for themselves. This is a large burden for a practitioner to take on, and if the practitioner does not want to agree to the risk associated with bringing such a case to court, it can lead to some actions not being pursued.[64]Accordingly, the ‘no foal, no fee’ arrangement is insufficient in resolving problems as regards access to justice, with potentially valid claims falling by the wayside, which a third-party funding arrangement may be able to solve or alleviate.
A further argument developed by Val Corbett is that the state may be missing an opportunity here.[65] The litigation market in the UK is large, with estimates ranging from £1.5 billion to £4.5 billion.[66] This market only seems likely to continue to grow, with PWC predicting it will grow from £2.2 billion in 2023 to £3.7 billion by 2028.[67] Could Ireland not jump on this opportunity to position itself as a global centre of international dispute resolution? Although Ireland could certainly develop as an international dispute resolution centre without legalising third-party funding, permitting and regulating such funding would likely be a significant competitive advantage and strengthen its position in competing with established arbitral centres. In addition, sophisticated commercial litigants may begin to increasingly expect access to such financing mechanisms.
International arbitration and litigation is extremely expensive, especially in investor-state disputes.[68] Due to this high cost,[69] litigants engaging in large-scale disputes increasingly rely on third-party funding to finance claims and manage risk. Jurisdictions hoping to become major dispute resolution hubs therefore tend to permit and regulate litigation funding rather than prohibit it. For instance, Singapore[70] and Hong Kong[71] successively passed laws to legalize and regulate third-party litigation funding as part of their status as leading international arbitration states.[72]
While this would increase litigation, there is a good case for arguing that it would also lead to an increase in jobs and an increased attractiveness for commercial firms to relocate to Ireland. There have already been moves in this direction, with s.128 of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023 allowing for the third-party funding of international commercial arbitration cases.[73]
Another policy argument in favour of third-party litigation funding is that it could redress the power imbalance between a party that can fund the action relatively easily, and the other party that cannot without significant risk.[74] Access to the strength of well-resourced and experienced third-party funders could increase the bargaining power of socially-marginalised litigants.[75] This justification may not be accepted entirely wholeheartedly however. Indeed, a well-funded interest group may well utilise litigation funding strategically to challenge socially progressive legislation, delay regulatory reform, or pursue politically motivated test cases. In these cases, third-party funding may amplify existing inequalities rather than alleviate them. As a result, there is a strong argument that if third-party funding is to be legalised, regulation should be tailored to mitigate these risks.
Now, of course, this only applies when one of the parties has vastly superior resources than the other and where existing arrangements such as legal aid are not enough to protect the ‘weaker’ party.[76] Indeed, unlike criminal legal aid, there is quite limited legal aid for civil cases in Ireland, despite these cases being of considerable public and personal importance.[77] Applicants must satisfy the financial eligibility requirements and make a financial contribution towards the cost of providing legal aid or advice.[78] Legal crowdfunding sites, such as ‘Crowd Justice’, have been used in Britain to finance climate activism in alleging that the UK government’s Net Zero strategy is incapable of achieving its aim of net zero emissions by 2050.[79] Of course, a reformed and adequately funded civil legal aid regime could, in principle, achieve many of the same objectives while avoiding some of the concerns associated with commercial funding, particularly the prioritisation of profitability over legal or social merit. Civil legal aid and third-party funding are best seen as serving complementary rather than mutually exclusive functions. Civil legal aid is grounded in principles of equality before the law and public access to justice, whereas third-party funding allocates support according to commercial viability and litigation risk, and it is perhaps a secondary benefit that it serves as an access to justice rationale. However it is strongly arguable that reforming one without the order would be ineffective. For instance, third-party funding will catch other consents that legal aid alone would not be capable of catching, such as the point developed by Val Corbett with regard to the litigation market.
IV. Arguments against supporting the legalisation of third-party funding
One obvious argument against the legalisation of third-party funding is that those claimants that win a case will not be fully compensated for their harm, as they will have to pay back the funder out of this compensation. This goes against the foundational principles of some areas of law, for instance, in the law of contract, where the plaintiff is supposed to be put in the same position they had been had before the contract was agreed, as per Parke B in Robinson v Harman.[80]However, this argument potentially lacks strength, in the face of lack of access to justice concerns. Even if the client fails to recover 100% of the compensation due to them, it is surely better to have some recompense than none at all.[81]Litigants who pursue third-party litigation funding should have managed expectations in the understanding that they will have to take on some disadvantage in the pursuit of their case and justice. Further, a third-party litigation funding model could lead to an increase in the already high cost of legal services as the funded party might increase overall litigation costs.[82] In addition, if third-party funding is successful it should increase demand for litigation in the sense that a cohort of prospective litigants who are willing to undertake litigation, but would be unable to do so because of the costs involved, would now be able to sue.[83] In light of the absence of detailed modelling of this concern, while raised by the LRC in their Consultation Paper, it is not possible to predict with high confidence what effect, if any, third-party funding may have on the cost of legal services in this jurisdiction.[84]
Additionally, the law must take into account that not all disputes should be open to third-party funding. For instance, there are perhaps arguments against allowing third-party funding in cases involving children, such as guardianship and custody proceedings. There is clear vulnerability in these disputes and a third-party’s interests will likely not be in the interests of the child.[85] However, as the LRC Consultation Report points out, it is rather unlikely that many profit-motivated third-party funders would be persuaded to invest in matters such as these, which typically do not involve any (significant) damages outcome.[86] Likewise, the issue of third-party funders trying to leave their arrangement with a client must be handled. One reasonable way of tackling this is to force funders to expressly set out terms as to their possible withdrawal in these arrangements, and to set out where they think it would be obvious that they would like to withdraw.[87]
V. Conclusion
Kelly J., extrajudicially has commented that Ireland is a high cost legal jurisdiction.[88] Access to justice has been acknowledged to be a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 34 of the Irish Constitution.[89]
This article has examined the move from the historical perspective to the present as well as the arguments for and against legalising third-party funding. It has argued that particularly with the backdrop of the constitutional right of access to the courts, as well as its commercial necessity, third-party funding should be legalised. There should be particular emphasis on cases that are not taken for profit, but to challenge state policy, as in the UK. However, the law must take into account that not all disputes should be open to third-party funding. For instance, there are perhaps arguments against allowing third-party funding in cases involving children, such as guardianship and custody proceedings. There is clear vulnerability in these disputes and a third-party’s interests will likely not be in the interests of the child.[90] The path forward is difficult but for the sake of broadening access to justice, striving for equality of arms, third-party funding must be made legal.
As Capper comments, if the Supreme Court in Persona had wanted to, there is no reason why it could not have given its blessing to third-party litigation funding.[91] Capper alludes to the role of judicial personality being a ‘more conservative body’ as the reason for the reluctance to recognise.[92] However, the executive and legislature have been slow to act in this regard. It has been suggested that perhaps the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, may be forced to act to defend the right of access to justice in the courts.[93] However, it has been acknowledged that to abolish the torts of champerty and maintenance would require legislative amendment for their removal. Therefore, the courts have been reluctant to act thus far. Perhaps the combination of the LRC’s Consultation Paper and Final Report on the issue will encourage the legislature to act on this most important issue. As Shally has commented, Ireland is ‘anomalous among its common law counterparts and fellow EU member states in its continued prohibition of third-party funding despite the access to justice benefits it may yield’.[94] Will the law here stay stagnant or develop? We must await with interest to see what the LRC recommends.
[1] Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Third-party Litigation Funding (LRC CP 69 – 2023), 26.
[2] Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v Minister for Public Enterprise, Ireland [2017] IESC 27.
[3] [2016] IEHC 187.
[4] Persona (n 2)[54].
[5] Persona (n 2) [2.1].
[6] Persona (n 2)[ 2.9].
[7] ibid.
[8] Nick Rowles Davies, Third Party Litigation Funding (OUP 2014), 5.
[9] Val Corbett, ‘Third Party Litigation Funding – time for a rethink’ (2023) 69 Irish Jurist 12.
[10] Jeremey Bentham, Works (Bowring (ed), 1843) vol 3, 19–20.
[11] Max Radin, ‘Maintenance by Champerty’ (1935) 24(1) California Law Review 48.
[12] Rowles Davies (n 8) 24.
[13] J G Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th edn, 1998), 153.
[14] Rowles Davies (n 8) 24.
[15] Letter XII: Maintenance and Champerty. – Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol 3 [1843].
[16] Rowles Davies (n 8) 25.
[17] ibid.
[18] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 64.
[19] ibid 65.
[20] ibid.
[21] Law Reform Commission, Fourth Programme of Law Reform (LRC 110-2013), Project 4.
[22] Law Reform Commission, Issues Paper on Contempt of Court and Other Offences and Torts Involving the Administration of Justice (LRC IP 10-2016).
[23] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 1.
[24] ibid 91.
[25] Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023.
[26] Per the requirements of Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC.
[27] European Parliament Resolution of 13 September 2022 with recommendations to the Commission on responsible private funding of litigation (2020/2130 (INL)).
[28]Arthur Cox, ‘LRC recommendations on Third-Party Litigation Funding expected in Spring 2026’ (Arthur Cox, 28 November 2025) <‘https://www.arthurcox.com/insights/lrc-recommendations-on-third-party-litigation-funding-expected-in-spring-2026/> accessed 22 May 2026.
[29] Persona (n 2).
[30] Persona (n 2) [7].
[31] ibid.
[32] Persona (n 3).
[33] Persona (n 2) [12].
[34] ibid.
[35] David Capper, ‘Supreme Court Rejects Litigation Funding’ (2017) 41(1) DULJ 197.
[36] Persona (n 2) [24] per Denham C.J.
[37] ibid [54].
[38] ibid [54].
[39] ibid [54].
[40] ibid [1.2] per Clarke J.
[41] Atlas GP Ltd v Kelly [2022] IEHC 443.
[42] Capper (n 35) 203.
[43] Campbell v Irish Light [2025] IEHC 223.
[44] ibid [58].
[45] ibid [47].
[46] ibid [48].
[47] ibid [50].
[48] [1994] 1 IR 1.
[49] Campbell v Irish Light [2025] IEHC 223 [52].
[50] ibid [58].
[51] ibid [59].
[52] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 37.
[53] British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Company Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006 at page 1014.
[54] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 38.
[55] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 35.
[56] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 38.
[57] Catherine Sanz, ‘‘‘Few practise law for fun, fame or philanthropy’’: Ireland’s legal costs problem’ Business Post (Dublin, 16 July 2023).
[58] Connor Beaton, ‘Average legal costs in litigated personal injury cases just over €23k’, Irish Legal News (Dublin, 3 November 2020).
[59] Mary Carolan, ‘Chief Justice warns about access to justice and importance of independent courts’, Irish Times (Dublin, 22 March 2022).
[60] Shannon v Shannon & Shannon [2024] IEHC 291 [3]. See further the comments of Mr. Justice Peter Kelly in The Bar Review, February 2018, Vol 23(1), 11: ‘Under the current system, as they say, the only people who can litigate in the High Court are paupers and millionaires’.
[61] Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (The Stationery Office 2010), 117.
[62] Catherine Donnelly and Ellen O’Callaghan, ‘The Case for Litigation Funding’ (2019) 24(4) Bar Review 107, 109.
[63] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 67.
[64] ibid.
[65] Val Corbett, ‘Third Party Litigation Funding – time for a rethink’ (2023) 69 Irish Jurist 12.
[66] Emily O’Neill, ‘Litigation Funding Overview – United Kingdom’ (Deminor Litigation Funding) <https://www.deminor.com/en/litigation-funding/global-landscape/united-kingdom/> accessed 19 May 2026.
[67] PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, UK Legal Services Market Report 2022 <https://www.pwc.co.uk/industries/assets/uk-legal-services-market-report-2022.pdf> accessed 19 May 2025.
[68] British Institute for International and Comparative Law, 2021 Empirical Study: Costs, Damages and Duration in Investor-State Arbitration(2021), 4.
[69] In one survey, 67% of the participants chose cost as the worst characteristic of international arbitration. Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration’, accessed 19 May 2026.
[70] Singapore Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) Regulations 2017 s.1.
[71] Part 10A of the Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) (Amendment) Ordinance 2017.
[72] Oliver Gayner and Susanna Khouri, ‘Singapore and Hong Kong: International Arbitration Meets Third Party Funding’ (2017) 40(3) Fordham International Law Journal 1033, 1046.
[73] Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023.
[74] Maya Steinitz, ‘Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding’ (2011) 452 Minnesota Law Review 1269.
[75] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 70.
[76] ibid 71.
[77] World Bank and International Bar Association, ‘A Tool for Justice: The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Legal Aid’ (2016) <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/592901569218028553/pdf/A-Tool-for-Justice-The-Cost-Benefit-Analysis-of-Legal-Aid.pdf> accessed 2 May 2026.
[78] Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 s 29(1).
[79] Eoin Jackson, ‘Litigation Crowdfunding and Access to Environmental Justice’(2022) Trinity College Law Review <https://trinitycollegelawreview.org/litigation-crowdfunding-and-access-to-environmental-justice/#_ftn9> accessed 7 August 2025.
[80] Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850, 855.
[81] Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (The Stationery Office 2010), 117.
[82] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 60
[83] ibid.
[84] ibid.
[85] ibid 133.
[86] ibid 61.
[87] ibid 153.
[88] Review of the Administration of Civil Justice (Department of Justice and Equality, October 2020).
[89] Greenclean Waste Management Ltd v Leahy p/a Maurice Leahy and Co Solicitors (No 2) [2014] IEHC 314, [23-24] (Hogan J).
[90] Law Reform Commission (n 1) 133.
[91] Capper (n 35) 206.
[92] ibid.
[93] ibid 207.
[94] Karen Lynch Shally, ‘Third-Party Litigation Funding: Irish Reform, Regulatory Tensions and European Influence’ (2025) 73 Irish Jurist 125, 125.
UCD Law Review 