Noah Williams , University College Dublin, BCL
LLM Candidate, University of Edinburgh
Noah Williams is an LL.M. candidate at the University of Edinburgh. He graduated with a BCL from UCD in 2025. He was the undergraduate winner of the 2024 Irish Legal History Society student essay competition. He has previously been published in History Ireland and Volume XXIV of this publication.
ABSTRACT
On 19 February 2026, President Connolly signed the Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024 into law. One of its most significant changes was the abolition of juries in defamation actions — a reform long argued to be necessary to address the unpredictable and disproportionate damages awards that have plagued Irish defamation law for decades.
But will it work?
The evidence suggests not. In Higgins v IAA, eight judges across two courts proposed four entirely different figures for the same case. No jury in sight, and yet the unpredictability remained. The same pattern played out in personal injury cases, where abolishing juries did not solve the problem of excessive awards. It took a book of quantum to do that. Ireland’s defamation damages remain wildly inconsistent, dwarfing comparable privacy awards and bearing little relationship to even the most catastrophic personal injury cases. The Bill, despite following the recommendations of the Report of the Review of the Defamation Act 2009, declined to introduce a damages cap on damages or book of quantum.
This article argues that was a mistake.
INTRODUCTION
Damages awards in defamation actions in Ireland are regularly criticised as unpredictable and disproportionate, which, it is argued, ‘threaten[s] the very existence of media organisations’.[1] The Report of the Review of the of the Defamation Act 2009[2] (‘the Report’) set out a list of proposals and recommendations to, inter alia, ‘avoid the risk of disproportionate and unpredictable awards and high level costs exercising a ‘’chilling effect’’ on freedom of expression, and particularly, on investigative journalism or public debate on issues of public interest’.[3] One proposal considered, but not recommended, was the introduction of a Cap on damages (Cap) or a Book of Quantum as a method of avoiding ‘the risk of disproportionate and unpredictable awards’. On 19 February 2026, President Connolly signed into law the Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024.[4] It followed the Report’s recommendations and did not introduce a Cap or a Book of Quantum.[5] The majority of the Bill’s provisions came into effect on 1 March 2026.[6]
In this article I consider whether a Cap or a Book of Quantum would reduce the likelihood of excessive awards of damages in defamation actions and ensure more predictability and proportionality around those awards. In doing so, I look at the damages awards in privacy actions and how they compare to defamation awards in media cases. I also assess the extent to which the current approach to damages in defamation actions conflates distinct legal functions by assessing compensation, vindication, and deterrence under a single head of general damages, thereby confusing the assessment of appropriate awards and contributing to unpredictability in their quantification.
In my view, given the unpredictability of awards of damages from juries and appellate courts, either a soft Cap aligned with personal injury and/or privacy awards, or a Book of Quantum loosely aligned with the same, could assist in assessing the level of compensatory damages in defamation actions. This is notwithstanding the fact that juries have now been abolished in defamation actions.[7] Lastly, I submit that the disparity between damages awards in Defamation actions and Privacy actions supports the introduction of a Cap or a Book of Quantum and any damages in relation to deterrence ought to be considered under the bracket of exemplary damages.
I. DEFAMATION ACTIONS
The Report notes the general consensus from the submissions received was that awards of damages in defamation cases are excessive.[8] Many submissions argued that a Cap or a Book of Quantum be introduced.[9] However, the Report did not recommend this approach.[10]
In relation to a Book of Quantum, it stated that it would be very difficult to apply in a defamation context where the injury is mainly intangible.[11] Furthermore, it stated that there is insufficient data available in relation to defamation actions for a Book of Quantum to be drawn.[12] Additionally, where a jury awards damages in the High Court, no reasons are given for the amount awarded.
The Report did not recommend a Cap on the basis that it would give rise to constitutional issues and that it would risk being too rigid. However, there is no indication of what particular constitutional issues are being referred to. It points out that in England and Wales there is no statutory Cap, which it argues suggests that guidance on proportionality and appropriate ranges for awards provided in judgments of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court may prove more effective than a statutory Cap.[13] However, there is in effect a ceiling in England and Wales which the Report does not reference.[14] In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, the English High Court noted that ‘a libel at the very top end of the level of seriousness, [will] only be likely to lead to an award of damages of up to £350,000.’[15] A UK law firm has commented that this is the effective cap on the award of compensatory damages in libel actions in England and Wales.[16]A UK parliament research briefing available in the House of Commons library notes that ‘[t]he upper limit for compensatory damages in defamation proceedings is currently approximately £300k for the ‘’gravest of allegations”’.[17]It is a common law ceiling for the award of damages in defamation actions in England & Wales. In Higgins v IAA[18] in the Irish Supreme Court, MacMenamin J. attempted a similar exercise. However, as will be demonstrated below, his use of ambiguous brackets, and his mischaracterisation of case-law means that the size of awards are left open to a significant amount of interpretation in a particular case. The result of this will be continued unpredictability. However, it must be noted that the High Court recently followed MacMenamin J.’s approach in Casey v McMenamin.[19]
Furthermore, how can it be argued that a soft Cap or a Book of Quantum could be unconstitutional in defamation actions when it is not in personal injuries actions? The existence of a soft Cap in personal injury actions was first mooted in 1984 in Sinnott v Quinnsworth Ltd.[20] A Book of Quantum has been operating in personal injuries actions (now replaced by personal injury guidelines) and has withstood all legal challenges, most recently in the Supreme Court in Delaney v PIAB.[21]
A soft Cap aligned with personal injury cases or a Book of Quantum loosely aligned with the same could provide several benefits to the process of assessing damages in defamation actions. Firstly, it could create more predictability in an entirely unpredictable process. This would lead to earlier resolution of actions, which benefits both sides while also alleviating pressure on the already overstretched courts system.[22] Furthermore, as demonstrated below, when one compares awards of damages in defamation actions to those of privacy actions or even personal injury actions it is clear that the amounts awarded are completely disproportionate. A soft Cap or a Book of Quantum could help in facilitating proportionality and fairness in the awarding of damages.
Some argue against comparing awards in defamation actions and awards in personal injury actions because different damage occurs in both actions and because damages in defamation actions, more specifically media defamation actions, are different in nature.[23] Personal injury damages are to compensate a victim for harms suffered and for loss of monies. However, as Lord Hoffman stated in the Daily Gleaner case, damages in defamation actions have an important feature not shared by personal injury claims, particularly in relation to deterrence.[24] He noted that damages in defamation actions ‘… often serve not only as compensation but also as an effective and necessary deterrent’ for the media to not ‘rid[e] roughshod over the rights of other citizens’ given they are generally more likely to have deeper pockets than individuals.[25] However, in my view, awards in personal injury actions can be instructive especially in relation to compensatory damages in exceptional cases, if the deterrence element is dealt with by way of exemplary damages..
In Delaney,[26] the Supreme Court engaged in a detailed discussion on the different nature of general damages when compared to special damages. Collins J. highlights that the main difference between the two is ‘a significant subjective element’ to general damages ‘[t]hat gives rise to significant issues of consistency, certainty and predictability.’[27]Notwithstanding this criticism, considering awards of damages at the upper limits of the soft Cap in personal injury actions, for example quadriplegia cases, could provide guidance in cases concerning the most egregious defamatory statements. Judges and juries could be assisted, by reference to the level of damages that may be appropriate for what is considered to be a particularly injurious defamatory statement. Furthermore, a Book of Quantum, which outlines awards of damages for less serious injuries, could inform an assessment as to what level of damages are appropriate for a less serious defamatory statement. The differing natures of general and special damages does not, ipso facto, mean that the level of awards of damages for personal injury claims could not inform the assessment of general damages in defamation actions. Rather, it could potentially provide for more proportionality between awards of damages in defamation actions, and awards of damages in other areas of the law. This could be achieved, notwithstanding ‘the significant subjective element’ noted by Collins J. in assessing how much pain and suffering was caused by a particular defamatory statement. Furthermore, it could in turn provide for more consistency, by giving authoritative guidance on how perceived exceptional, moderate, and minor damage should be considered.
In Kisella v Kenmare,[28] Irvine J commented that it could be of some assistance to compare a defamation award to a serious personal injury award.[29] In MN v SM[30] in 2005, the Supreme Court set aside an award of €600,000 to a young woman in respect of injuries suffered as a result of sexual abuse by the Defendant over a number of years culminating in rape. The Court substituted a sum of €350,000, as €600,000 was far in excess of a reasonable award of compensation, and disproportionate.[31] The award substituted by the Supreme Court in Leech v Independent Newspapers[32] is nearly four times the award in MN and almost three times what would be awarded to someone rendered quadriplegic in a catastrophic personal injuries case.[33] Should any award in a defamation action exceed an award given to a teenager who has been sexually abused and raped, or someone who has been rendered quadriplegic?
If there is a need for deterrence, the assessment of damages in defamation actions could be assisted by a two pronged approach. Firstly, an assessment of the amount of damages needed to compensate the victim for their injuries. And secondly, an assessment of the amount of damages needed (if any) to provide the deterrent effect, under the bracket of exemplary damages. Exemplary damages are a different category of damages to compensatory damages, and are ‘predominantly to act as a deterrent and to show the wrongdoer that ‘’tort does not pay’’’.[34] Compensatory damages are to compensate a victim for losses suffered.[35] If a deterrent effect is necessary in a given case, it ought to be considered under the separate category of exemplary damages, and not grouped in with compensatory damages. This would not only be legally correct, but it would also provide more clarity as to how injuries are assessed and quantified. Further, it would provide guidance in comparing harm and damages in different types of actions.
The unpredictability of awards in defamation actions is clearly demonstrated through the case-law. In McDonagh v Sunday Newspapers Ltd,[36] decided in 1993, the Supreme Court upheld an award of IR£90,000 which Finlay CJ described as being ‘at the top of the appropriate range’[37] while noting that the defamatory statement was an extremely grave accusation of professional misconduct and sympathy with terrorist causes.[38] Six years later, in De Rossa v Independent Newspapers,[39] the Supreme Court upheld an award of IR£300,000, noting that though this was ‘a substantial sum […] the libel was serious and grave involving an imputation that the Respondent was involved or tolerated serious crime’[40] and ‘it is hard to imagine a more serious [libel]’.[41] Later, in 2009, the Court in Leech v Independent Newspaper (Ireland) Ltd,[42] reduced an award of €1.872 million to €1.25 million stating that the defamation was ‘very serious’ but not ‘the most serious’. If it was not the most serious, why was the award significantly higher than the De Rossa award? Even accounting for inflation and the change in currencies, the level of awards dramatically increased over this period.
In my view, the decision in Higgins v IAA[43] is the clearest demonstration of the benefits that a Book of Quantum or Cap would provide. In Higgins, there were emails sent to five individuals wrongly insinuating that Captain Higgins had not been authorised to fly a microlight plane. The High Court awarded damages of €387,000.[44] In the Court of Appeal,[45]with three judges presiding, the amount was reduced to €76,500.[46] On further appeal to the Supreme Court, Higgins was awarded €202,500.[47] Of the five judges hearing the case in the Supreme Court, two would have been inclined to uphold the original High Court figure but agreed to compromise to €202,000 to go with the majority.[48] Two of the other judges were prepared to award €202,500[49] and the fifth judge awarded €100,000.[50] This shows 8 judges dealing with the same case giving four different figures for compensation.
In the main Supreme Court judgment in Higgins,[51] MacMenamin J. suggested four brackets of awards: moderate: €0-50,000[52]; median: €50,000-120,000;[53] serious: €125,000-199,000;[54] and cases at the very top: more than €200,000 – whilst it was noted that courts had very seldom awarded more than €300,000.[55] He categorised the cases of De Rossaand Leech as ‘truly exceptional’.[56] However the Supreme Court in De Rossa described it as the most serious[57], not exceptional, and in Leech[58], the Court said that while it was serious, it was not ‘the most serious’.[59]
It might be argued that the MacMenamin J. figures could be used as a substitution for a Cap or a Book of Quantum, but I disagree with this approach. In my view, the brackets set out in Higgins are ambiguous and faulty. The categorisations of the awards in De Rossa and Leech are inconsistent with those of the presiding judges. Furthermore, the ranges are too broad and non-specific, and are likely to lead to further unpredictability of awards.
The Report recommended that juries be abolished in defamation actions to help solve the issue of ‘disproportionate and unpredictable awards’.[60] The Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024 was signed into law by President Connolly on 19 February 2026 which, inter alia, abolished juries. Does this negate the need for a soft-Cap or a Book of Quantum? I suggest it does not. In Higgins, there were eight judges and four quite different amounts proposed for compensation. This case illustrates that unpredictability in awards of damages in defamation would not be solved simply by abolishing juries. Abolishing juries did not solve the issue of unpredictable and excessive awards in personal injury actions which ultimately led to the Book of Quantum being introduced.[61]
II. PRIVACY ACTIONS
Defamation actions are concerned with an individual’s reputation, while Privacy actions are generally concerned with securing the autonomy of the individual.[62] That said, John Tasioulas argues the two are similar as they both relate to the dignity of the individual, which has an essential role in grounding human rights.[63] However, the similarity is not reflected in the awards of damages. Rather, defamation actions seem to attract far higher awards of damages than privacy.
Comparing the awards for gross breaches of privacy in Herrity v Associated Newspapers[64] and Nolan v Sunday Newspapers[65] with defamation awards is instructive. In Herrity, private telephone conversations were illegally recorded and published to illustrate an affair between a parish priest and a married woman. The judge awarded €60,000 ‘for the conscious and deliberate and unjustified breach of the plaintiffs right to privacy and the undoubted and significant distress caused to the plaintiff as a result of that breach’.[66] She also awarded punitive damages of €30,000 for the conduct which she described as ‘nothing short of outrageous’.[67]
In Nolan, articles were published describing Nolan (an ex inter-county GAA player) as an attendee and organiser of swingers’ parties and, as a chief organiser of orgies in the State with an undertone of criminality, claims which Nolan successfully argued were defamatory.[68] These articles were also accompanied by photos of Nolan at such parties. Nolan lost access to his children, whose names were changed so as to avoid association with him.[69] Furthermore, ‘he was shunned by neighbours and ostracised by his friends and was the subject of public scorn and humiliation.’[70] €200,000 was awarded for the defamation claim while only €50,000 was awarded for breach of privacy. This case exemplifies the different monetary value given to defamation claims.
This self-evident disparity, is, in my view, further evidence of the need for greater consistency between the awards of damages in defamation actions and in privacy actions. It highlights the absence of a coherent framework capable of ensuring consistency and proportionality between the awards of damages in defamation and privacy actions. It is submitted, a Book of Quantum or soft Cap loosely aligned with personal injury and/or privacy actions would assist here.
CONCLUSION
The Report did not recommend the introduction of a Book of Quantum or a Cap.[71] I submit that this was incorrect. Damages in media defamation actions are unpredictable and disproportionate. A soft Cap loosely aligned with personal injury and/or privacy actions or a similarly aligned Book of Quantum would provide several benefits. As shown, it could help create more predictability in defamation awards. Additionally, it would create proportionality between awards of damages in defamation and other areas of the law. In my view, the recommendation should be reconsidered. Finally, deterrence is more appropriately addressed through exemplary damages. Without changing this, the assessment of damages in defamation actions and its comparison with other actions will remain difficult.
[1] ‘Ireland’s Draconian Defamation Laws must be Reformed – It’s in The Public Interest’ (NewsBrands Ireland) (http://newsbrandsireland.ie/policy-issues/defamation/) accessed 1 April 2024.
[2] Department of Justice, Report of the Review of the Defamation Act of 2009 (1 March 2022). [hereinafter Report of the Defamation Act]
[3] ibid 11.
[4] President of Ireland, ‘President Connolly signs the Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024’ (19 February 2026) <https://president.ie/media-library/news-releases/president-connolly-signs-the-defamation-amendment-bill-2024?utm_source=chatgpt.com> accessed 22 February 2026.
[5] Minister for Justice Jim O’Callaghan signed the Act’s Commencement Order on 25 February; Department of Justice, ‘Minister Jim O’Callaghan Signs Defamation Amendment Act Commencement Order 2026’ (gov.ie, 2026) <https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-justice-home-affairs-and-migration/press-releases/minister-jim-ocallaghan-signs-defamation-amendment-act-commencement-order-2026/> accessed 1 March 2026.
[6] ibid
[7] Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024 (Bill 67 of 2024) s 4.
[8] Report of the Defamation Act (n 2) 198.
[9] ibid 199.
[10] ibid 269.
[11] ibid 26.
[12] ibid.
[13] For example the guidance given in Higgins v Irish Aviation Authority [2022] IESC 13.
[14] Cairns v Modi / KC v MGN Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1382; Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd & Ors [2021] EWHC 1797.
[15] Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd & Ors [2021] EWHC 1797 [222].
[16] Carruthers Law, ‘A Guide to Damages in Defamation Claims’ (October 2025) <https://www.carruthers-law.co.uk/our-services/defamation/damages-awards-in-defamation-claims/> accessed 26 February 2026.
[17] House of Commons Library, ‘Lawfare and the UK Court System’ (19 January 2022) <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2022-0016/> accessed 26 February 2026.
[18] [2022] IESC 13.
[19] [2024] IEHC 705.
[20] 1984 WJSC-SC 1719.
[21] [2024] IESC 10, [2024] 4 JIC 0906 [hereinafter Delaney].
[22] Law Society of Ireland, ‘Increased investment needed to make the justice system deliver for the country and those who need it most’ (5 September 2025) <https://www.lawsociety.ie/news/media-centre/Press-Releases/increased-investment-needed-to-make-the-justice-system-deliver-for-the-country-and-those-who-need-it-most2/> accessed 26 February 2026; Sorcha Pollak, ‘‘Overstretched legal system’ leaving domestic abuse survivors at risk’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 17 April 2018).
[23] The Gleaner Co Ltd v Abraham [2004] 1 AC 628 [50] [53].
[24] ibid [53].
[25] ibid.
[26] Delaney (n 21).
[27] ibid [275(5)].
[28] [2019] 2 IR 750.
[29] ibid [149].
[30] [2005] IESC 17, [2005] IESC 30.
[31] MN v SM [2005] IESC 30 [42].
[32] [2014] IESC 79.
[33] Judicial Council, Personal Injuries Guidelines (2021), 9.
[34] David Culleton, ‘The Law Relating to Aggravated Damages’ (2020) 4(2) Irish Judicial Studies Journal 1. Rookes v Barnard [1964] 1 All ER 367, [411].
[35] Conway v INTO [1991] 2 IR 305 13, 14.
[36] McDonagh v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [1993] WJSC-SC 4009.
[37] ibid 15.
[38] ibid 16, 17.
[39] Proinsias de Rossa v Independent Newspapers Plc [1999] 4 IR 432.
[40] ibid 471.
[41] ibid 464.
[42] Leech v Independent Newspaper (Ireland) Ltd [2014] IESC 79, [2015] 2 IR 214.
[43] [2022] IESC 13.
[44] ibid 1.
[45] [2020] IECA 157.
[46] ibid [102].
[47] [2022] IESC 13 [198].
[48] ibid Baker J. [32], Woulfe J. [15].
[49] ibid MacMenamin J. [189], Dunne J [1].
[50] ibid Hogan J. [74].
[51] [2022] IESC 13.
[52] ibid [157].
[53] ibid [158].
[54] ibid [159].
[55] ibid [160].
[56] ibid [161].
[57] Proinsias de Rossa v Independent Newspapers Plc [1999] 4 IR 432, 470.
[58] [2014] IESC 79.
[59] ibid 18.
[60] Report of the Defamation Act (n 2), 269.
[61] Thomas Dowling, ‘Personal Injury Claims – Assessing the Book of Quantum’ (Hogan Dowling McNamara, 8 September 2016) <https://hdm.ie/personal-injuries-claim/#:~:text=The%20Book%20of%20Quantum%20is%20dated%20June%202004%20and%20was,assessing%20the%20value%20of%20claims.>accessed 25 March 2024.
[62] Eoin Carolan and Ailbhe O’Neill, Media Law in Ireland (2nd edn, Bloomsbury Publishing 2019) para 7.04.
[63] Christopher McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press 2013) ch 17.
[64] Herrity v Associated Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd. [2008] IEHC 249.
[65] Nolan v Sunday Newspapers Limited (trading as Sunday World) [2019] IECA 141. [Hereinafter Nolan]
[66] [2008] IEHC 249, 44.
[67] ibid.
[68] At trial it was proven that Nolan only attended several of the parties and was never an organiser.
[69] Nolan, (n 65) [10, 20].
[70] ibid [10].
[71] Report of the Defamation Act (n 2) 198.
UCD Law Review 